🇫🇷 84 Series A in 2023 in France: Between Continuity and New Paradigms
84 startups successfully completed Series A funding in 2023, compared to 100 in 2022 and 42 in 2021: what lessons can we draw from these three years?
The author of this post is Julien PetitHere is the third edition of this study on the exact number of companies (aka startups) that have successfully raised Series A funding in France.
This new edition will be more comprehensive: beyond analyzing the 2023 results, we will put all three studies conducted to date into perspective. What trends are emerging? What evolutions can we observe? What lessons, sometimes surprising, can we draw from them?
🛣 If you don't feel like reading this study and prefer a summary of the data in slide deck format, here's the LINK.
📊 For the more curious readers hungry for raw data and cross-analysis, you can take a look at the database via this LINK.
👉 Previous years' studies: 2021 and 2022.
Presentation of Data on Companies that Completed a Series A in 2023
How Many Companies Successfully Raised a Series A in 2023?
The cornerstone of our study is a critical data point: 84 companies completed a Series A in 2023.
A methodological note: annual searches using database keywords like "Series A" and "2023" yield inaccurate results. This occurs because our data comes from scraped press releases, often obscured by marketing language. Similar to Wikipedia's approach, we employ rigorous cross-referencing to ensure accuracy.
Looking at historical context, the 2021-2022 period averaged 75 Series A completions. This suggests the annual opportunity threshold hovers around this figure. We anticipate this pace will remain stable, particularly since France's most active VCs have secured new funds that require deployment. This financial reality supports our projection of a consistent "cruising speed" for Series A completions in the coming years.
What Are the Odds of Successfully Raising a Series A?
In 2023, startups faced a 1.7% probability of securing Series A funding.
This represents a slight decline from our 2022 analysis, which recorded 100 startups reaching Series A stage—a 2% probability rate.
For consistency and comparability, we applied the same hypotheses and methodological framework across both years. Readers interested in reviewing our methodological approach or examining our complete 2022 study can access it via the link provided, or refer to the appendix at the conclusion of this report.
Paris Still Dominates Regional Competition
Paris maintains its dominance with 62% of all Series A deals, reinforcing its position as France's startup capital.
However, Lyon emerged as this year's standout performer, propelling 9 startups to Series A funding—an unprecedented achievement for the region. This success was driven by:
5 investments from Lyon-connected investors: Axeleo (backing Tenacy and Mob-Energy), Demeter (supporting RED Horticulture), the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes Sovereign Fund (investing in Stane), and La Banque des Territoires (funding Vizcab).
4 investments from corporate funds: Orange Digital Ventures (Datagalaxy), Crédit Mutuel (Mecaware), Eurazeo (Million Victories), and Serena through its MGEM Racine2 fund (Santé Académie).
Rennes also demonstrated notable momentum, with 4 companies securing Series A funding: Check & Visit, Agriodor, Simango, and Purecontrol.
Having VCs in Your First Round Remains Important for Raising a Series A
Our analysis reveals a consistent pattern, despite a slight downward shift: 60% of Series A recipients secured VC backing in their initial funding round.
This trend, while moderately less pronounced than previous years, reflects an enduring market dynamic. VCs continue to leverage their agility and extensive networks to identify high-potential opportunities early, effectively securing premium deals before Business Angels can mobilize.
The ecosystem continues to operate as a relatively closed network, where former entrepreneurs-turned-Business Angels channel promising startups to their preferred VC partners, creating an environment that remains challenging for newcomers to penetrate.
The Startup Investment World Prefers "Bits" Over "Atoms"
B2B SaaS companies maintain their leadership position, though with a significant shift in the landscape: pure software ventures have declined from 67% to 44%, while hybrid "software + people" models have increased from 16% to 24%.
In a notable sector realignment, medtech has now overtaken fintech in investor appeal. Despite these evolving preferences, venture capital continues to demonstrate a clear bias toward digital products composed of "bits" rather than physical products made of "atoms".
Gender parity between Men and Women is progressing
The representation of women entrepreneurs securing Series A funding shows modest progress, increasing from 9% to 12%. However, this incremental improvement falls significantly short of the transformation needed to achieve genuine gender equity in the startup ecosystem!
Zooming in on the most common characteristics among Series A compatible entrepreneurs
The French startup ecosystem defies the romanticized myth of the lone young coder building an empire from a brilliant idea. A more sophisticated reality emerges: entrepreneurs attracting VC funding follow distinct pathways to success.
Entrepreneur backgrounds reveal clear patterns:
18% (30/164) bring previous entrepreneurial experience
18% (31/164) graduated from elite preparatory schools (Stanislas, Henri IV, Lycée Sainte-Geneviève)
14% (24/164) possess startup expertise
20% (34/164) developed careers in large corporations
6% (10/164) come from consulting backgrounds
Only 7% (12/164) hold PhD qualifications
Only 8% (14/164) are senior developers
Just 2 entrepreneurs transitioned from VC careers
🤝 Significantly, 35% of funded startups feature founding teams with established relationships, having known each other extensively and often collaborated previously:
12 startups were founded by colleagues from shared workplace experiences
5 startups feature founders who were previous business partners
13 startups originated from founders who connected during their education
Who are the most active funds in Series A in 2023?
While Eurazeo dominated last year's funding landscape, their activity diminished significantly in 2023, participating in just two Series A rounds (Million Victories and Poppins).
Crédit Mutuel emerged as this year's most active investor through its twin vehicles: Crédit Mutuel Innovation and Crédit Mutuel Equity (CM-CIC).
Educapital also showed remarkable momentum, deploying capital from its newly launched €150M second fund across 5 startups (Hupso, Merciapp, Mentorshow, Lunii, and HappyPal) since its 2017 inception.
😲😲😲 Perhaps most concerning, numerous tier-1 funds were notably absent from Series A activity in 2023. This represents a potentially troubling indicator for the ecosystem's future health: Partech, Evolem, Xange, Daphni, Aglaé, Elaia, Ventech, 360 Capital, White Star Capital, Balderton, Index Ventures, GFC, Atomico, Dawn Capital, Connect Ventures, Sequoia, Localglobe, Frontline, Heartcore, Accel, Benchmark, Eight Roads, Firstmark, Orange Digitale Venture, Creandum, Northzone, Hedosophia, Felix Capital, Notion Capital & Blossom Capital.
Fund Activity Analysis
French Fund Performance
The figures reveal that French funds invest on average in less than one startup in Series A per year. The average is precisely 1.3 deals per year.
Among the exceptions, certain funds stand out:
Serena: Average of 2.3 investments per year, with a peak in 2021 (4 Series A), a decrease in 2022 (2) and only 1 in 2023.
ISAI: Also at 2.3 on average, with a record in 2022 (5 Series A) but only 1 in 2021 and 2023. Note that ISAI's Seed investments lead to some impressive Series A rounds a few years later.
Eurazeo: The most active on average with 4.3 Series A per year, including a maximum of 6 in 2022.
Daphni: Average of 3 investments per year, with strong activity in 2021 (5 Series A), a gradual decrease to 0 in 2023.
Alven: 2.7 on average, also showing a decline in activity (5 in 2021, 2 in 2022, 1 in 2023).
Omnes: Average of 2, with a peak in 2022 (4 Series A) but only 1 per year for 2021 and 2023.
Seventure: Active with 2 Series A on average, but nothing in 2021, followed by 4 in 2022 and 2 in 2023.
Crédit Mutuel: 3 Series A per year on average, with a total absence in 2021, then 3 in 2022, culminating at 6 in 2023.
International Fund Retreat
The French market has failed to attract significant international investment. Among 29 international funds with any French Series A activity, commitment remains minimal at just 0.4 startups financed per year per fund.
Even the most active international investors—Balderton, Accel, Northzone, P9, a16z and Speedinvest—barely exceed this threshold, investing in just over one startup annually. Balderton leads this group with 1.3 investments yearly.
Several prominent global VCs (Northzone, Index, Dawn Capital, Benchmark, Firstmark, Hedosophia) made no Series A investments in France from 2021-2023.
Comparative Analysis: Emerging Trends Over Three Years
Structural Trends That Persist
1. Parisian Dominance Still Present, But Eroding
Paris continues to dominate Series A fundraising, although this hegemony is eroding. In 2022, 84% of startups that raised a Series A were based in Paris, but this figure drops to 62% in 2023.
2. The Role of VCs in the First Round of Investment
Historically, startups that received a Seed round led by VCs had an advantage in accessing Series A funding. In 2022, 77% of Series A raises were preceded by a VC-led Seed round. In 2023, this figure drops to 60%.
For startups that relied solely on Business Angels for their Seed round, accessing Series A remains a significant challenge. The credibility brought by a VC remains a safe bet. Seed and Series A VCs are also on the same wavelength in terms of financial objectives and economic models (asymmetry of interest between VCs and BAs).
3. The Predominance of Software Startups is Decreasing (Slightly)
In 2022, 67% of startups that raised a Series A were purely software companies. This model, which had long dominated due to its supposed rapid "scalability" and high margins, now sees its share decrease to 44% in 2023.
Investors seem to be turning toward hybrid models, combining software and operations, which increase from 16% in 2022 to 24% in 2023.
4. Profile of Entrepreneurs Who Successfully Raise a Series A
The data shows that founders with prior entrepreneurial experience are much more successful at raising a Series A.
Additionally, graduates from prestigious schools (like HEC, Polytechnique, or Sciences Po), and especially those with education from prestigious preparatory schools, are also overrepresented. Similarly, entrepreneurs with consulting backgrounds (McKinsey, BCG, Bain).
However, a persistent imbalance remains in profile diversity: women founders remain largely underrepresented. In 2022, they represented only 9% of founders of startups that raised a Series A, a figure that has only slightly increased to 12% in 2023.
Major Changes Observed in 2023
1. Sector Evolution: Fintech Supplanted by Medtech
In 2022, fintech dominated with 21% of Series A raises, driven by enthusiasm for neobanks, payment solutions, and digitalized financial services. However, in 2023, medtech takes first place with 13%.
2. The Rise of Solo Founders: A Paradigm Shift?
Another notable evolution is the rise of solo founders. In 2022, only 14% of Series A rounds were raised by startups founded by a single person. This figure climbs to 26% in 2023.
The 24-Month Rule
The Series B Dilemma: Growth vs. Survival
For a decade, the famous 24-month rule between fundraising rounds has dictated the tempo for startups. A clear cadence: after a Series A, a company had two years to demonstrate hypergrowth capacity, secure its market position, and justify a Series B raise — a key step to continue its trajectory. But today, this balance is more precarious than ever.
A Delicate Balance
Grow quickly to stay in the VC game: Aggressively deploying raised funds is necessary to achieve a dominant market position, attract investor attention, and secure the next cash injection.
Being too cautious can also lead to failure: By trying to limit investment and deployed cash, one risks not reaching the metrics and performance level expected by Series B investors, thus compromising the company's future.
It's a dangerous tightrope. Being too conservative means missing the growth level required by VCs. Pushing too hard means risking a crash if a Series B fails to materialize.
The future belongs to those who can master this fragile balance between aggressive deployment and prudent management. But one thing is certain: missing the Series B likely signals the end of the adventure and especially marks the end of ambition to become the category leader.
From Series A to B: What 2021 Teaches Us
To understand this phenomenon, we examined French startups that raised a Series A in 2021. Of the 42 startups that succeeded in this round that year:
Only 10 startups managed to raise a Series B, representing a conversion rate of 23%. In other words, nearly 8 out of 10 startups failed to cross this critical threshold.
Only 1 startup, Pennylane, succeeded in raising a Series C. This figure highlights how increasingly difficult it becomes to continue accessing funds for advanced stages.
7 startups had to settle for "bridge" rounds. This indicates difficulty in raising standard rounds, with "bridge rounds" often serving as lifelines to extend runway. These emergency funding rounds are generally less advantageous, dilutive, and often perceived as a sign of fragility.
17 startups, or 40%, have not managed to raise additional funds since their Series A, raising serious questions about their sustainability. Among these, 2 have already ceased operations, illustrating the harsh reality of a market that has become more demanding.
The "Don't Look Up Effect" Persists
The disconnect persists in 2024, with entrepreneurs continuing to view Series A funding as an entitlement despite numerous warning indicators. This cognitive dissonance—what I labeled the "Don't Look Up Effect" in 2021—remains remarkably resilient against contrary market evidence.
My 2021 research exposed a stark reality gap: while Dealroom and similar sources projected optimistic funding numbers, only 42 French startups actually secured Series A funding. This revelation triggered skepticism: some questioned my methodology, while others expressed shock at the disparity between perception and market conditions. Despite criticism, exposing this collective delusion was crucial for the French startup ecosystem.
Three years later, we're witnessing history repeat itself. My latest analysis of 2023 Series A rounds reconfirms that early-stage funding remains extraordinarily selective, with just 84 completed deals—a figure that sharply contradicts the optimistic narratives promoted by entrepreneurial support structures and ecosystem cheerleaders. The time for willful blindness has ended.
This funding accessibility myth continues to dominate startup discourse, creating dangerous expectations among founders. Too many entrepreneurs still believe that combining a compelling concept with SaaS architecture and basic performance metrics automatically unlocks millions in funding. The reality is fundamentally different: Series A isn't a standardized assessment where everyone receives their allocation. It's an intensely competitive selection process favoring those who are meticulously prepared, strategically positioned, and thoroughly versed in the nuances of the "VC game.
Conclusion: Is the Selective Memory of the Startup Ecosystem a Concerning Signal?
It's surprising to note that, among more than 200 experts interviewed — including General Partners from renowned funds — no one could precisely answer when asked to name French VC-backed companies that achieved exits of more than one billion euros. This lack of collective knowledge isn't just surprising; it reveals a deeper problem. If in any high-level competition, knowing your champions is essential for calibration, why would it be any different for the VC Game? If even experts can't cite these success stories, how can we expect our entrepreneurs to position themselves for success? (The answer is Criteo, Believe, and Kyriba = $5.5 billion total).
🇪🇺 See the study on European exits over one billionThis ignorance is all the more alarming when examining the figures I revealed in my study on exits in Europe. France ranks tenth in terms of total amount of exits over one billion euros. With only 5.5 billion in exits in total over the last 20 years, we lag far behind countries like England (65 billion), Germany (55 billion), or even Sweden (45 billion). Worse still, Romania, with a single company, generated 35 billion in exits. How is it that no one saw this blatant underperformance of the French ecosystem coming? It seems there has been a sort of selective memory, a collective reluctance to look where it hurts.
Rather than focusing on sterile debates around state aid mechanisms like JEI or CIR, our priority should be to understand the fundamental rules of the VC Game. To succeed, you need to aim for a minimum 3x return on a portfolio, which necessarily implies major exits of more than a billion. Yet, we must acknowledge that we are behind. This collective self-congratulation that consists of convincing ourselves that everything is fine, simply because spectacular fundraising rounds are announced, is an illusion. We are not measuring up, and it's crucial to admit this in order to quickly correct course.
By not looking at the real performance indicators, how can we hope to help our entrepreneurs calibrate for a competition that is, by nature, extremely difficult and competitive? The current situation shows that we are focusing on the wrong goals and, consequently, we are missing the opportunity to create a truly competitive ecosystem capable of rivaling our European neighbors and especially American cousins.
Appendix
Presentation of Our Method: A Rigorous, Transparent, and Collaborative Approach
🕵️♂️ Each year, this study is based on a rigorous approach to ensure the reliability and relevance of the data. Unlike many analyses that are limited to quick extrapolations, we have opted for an in-depth, verifiable approach and a methodology organized around several key steps.
Step 1: Collaboration with Dealroom for initial collection We are fortunate to collaborate with Dealroom, a platform recognized for its comprehensive databases on startups and investments. This partnership allows us to access a first layer of structured and reliable data. However, this automated collection is only a starting point.
Step 2: Manual validation and enrichment of data Based on the data provided by Dealroom, we conducted thorough enrichment and validation work. This includes:
Direct contact with entrepreneurs and investors: To cross-reference information from Dealroom and obtain confirmations on amounts raised, investors involved, and operation dates.
Consultation of minutes of general meetings: In 40% of cases, we used Pappers to access official documents and precisely verify data related to fundraising.
Step 3: Transparency and free access to data One of the differentiating points of this study is making the data freely accessible. Unlike many analyses that publish only conclusions without allowing verification of data and methodology, we have taken the opposite approach. All datasets used will be accessible, so that everyone can explore, analyze, and validate the results.
Step 4: A crafted and academic approach We want to emphasize that this study was carried out with a crafted, precise and meticulous approach, combining human rigor and academic standards. While automation facilitates certain steps, we have chosen to go beyond.
Here are the databases for the study:
- 2021
- 2022
- 2023What is Our Definition of a Series A?
A Series A is a funding round generally greater than 3 million euros, although the amount can sometimes reach much higher sums. However, the amount is not the only criterion for defining a Series A. Another essential criterion is whether the startup has already raised funds before this raise of more than 3 million.
• If the round of 3 million or more is the first funding round for the startup, then this financing is considered a Seed round.
• If, on the other hand, the startup has already completed previous funding rounds (for example, a round of 500,000€, 1 million€, or 2 million€), then this financing of more than 3 million euros will be classified as a Series A.
In summary: For a round to be considered a Series A, it must be greater than 3 million euros and be preceded by previous fundraising. If it's the first funding round and exceeds 3 million euros, it is considered a Seed round instead.
How Many Startups Complete the First Rounds (pre-Seed - Seed)?
The question of how many startups complete a first funding round (pre-Seed or Seed) is a puzzle, mainly because there is no universal definition of these funding stages. In our analysis, we adopted a pragmatic approach: a startup in pre-Seed or Seed is a company that qualifies as "innovative," has injected equity from founders or BAs, and has benefited from external financing such as loans or grants (JEI, CIR...), often via actors such as BPI France.
According to our research and discussions with experts over the past six years, it is estimated that at least 5000 companies per year, based in France, meet these criteria. This remains an estimate, as no organization has yet conducted a comprehensive study on the subject. This figure serves as a reference, corroborated by data such as the 13,000 startups listed by France Digitale still active today. Assuming that at least a third of them have already completed a first round, this figure remains consistent.
Are Biotechs Included in the Study?
The biotech category is a game of its own, with specialized VCs and a marked path. Biotech VCs raise funds specifically for biotech.
However, with the emergence of "deeptech," the boundaries seem to be eroding, but we still need to wait a few years to see if "deeptech" investors come to take deals from biotech funds.
What is the Purpose of These Series A Studies for the Past Three Years?
What is the Purpose of These Series A Studies for the Past Three Years?
These studies were initiated to address a critical need for clarification in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. For several years, a flagrant disconnect has existed between media discourse exalting record fundraising and the reality experienced by startups. The main objective is therefore to provide a realistic order of magnitude on the number of Series A completed each year in France, while deconstructing certain myths around VC funding.
Why are these studies essential?
Combat the optical effect of flattering figures: The figure of "100 Series A" per year, for example, may seem impressive. However, it's easy to misinterpret this number and conclude that the market is flourishing. In reality, this figure reveals fierce competition and drastic selection among startups.
Reset entrepreneurs' perception: Many entrepreneurs approach their next funding round with excessive confidence, thinking that raising funds is a mere formality. Common phrases like "we're raising in Q3" or "80% chance of success" reflect a lack of preparation for a much more complex reality. These studies aim to remind that raising funds with VCs is an ultra-selective exam, not a continuous assessment.
Introduce a new analytical framework for the ecosystem: This type of work is virtually absent from incubators, accelerators, or startup campuses. Yet, recognizing these realities could constitute a strategic advantage for the French ecosystem. By adopting a more demanding and fact-based approach, we could evolve towards a version 2 of the startup ecosystem, where competition and resource allocation would be better understood.
Create a framework to better calibrate to the VC game: The ultimate goal of these studies is to help entrepreneurs better calibrate themselves to the rules of the game imposed by VCs. These rules are based on a simple observation: Series A opportunities are limited, and it's crucial to prepare for them rigorously. By providing reliable data, we hope not only to illuminate the market but also to increase the pool of startups capable of succeeding in the VC game.
An opportunity for the French ecosystem Accepting this reality doesn't mean being pessimistic, but rather seizing a unique opportunity. If the French ecosystem manages to integrate this understanding earlier than other markets, it could gain a major competitive advantage. This would be an opportunity to build a more efficient entrepreneurial environment that's more aligned with the true requirements of early-stage funding.
In conclusion, these studies don't seek to give an exact probability of raising a Series A, but to offer a realistic perspective to avoid illusions of abundance. We will continue this work to inform, awaken, and better prepare tomorrow's players.
The author of this post is Julien Petit
“Cutting Through The Noise” by Mighty Nine
Do you have a compelling story to influence the best VCs?
We are a VC fundraising investment bank.
